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Breakthroughs in thinking are usually made by rendering certain differences less 
different. Works of art, political mots d’ordre, scientific creations – as well as 
psychoanalytic interpretations - are capable of novelty precisely because, through 
these creations, we have access to a standpoint from which what has come before 
suddenly emerges as a field of variations contained within certain historical 
restrictions. New artistic experiments reveal the formal commitments of previous 
artistic sequences, new political affirmations can “subtract" us from ideologically 
overdetermined political conflicts, scientific abstraction can determine invariances 
which turn previous general claims into regional ones, just as surprising love 
encounters can lead us to reassess a life of repetitions and insisting idealizations. 
Such seems to also be the proper way of evaluating the merit of David Pavón-
Cuéllar’s new book, Marxism and Psychoanalysis: In or Against Psychology? 
(Routledge, 2017), for it introduces a certain productive indifference into the 
otherwise disparate and conflicting attempts to bind Marx and Freud together. In 
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doing so, Pavón-Cuéllar has both shone a light on the internal organization of this 
research program and opened up interesting lines of inquiry which cut across any 
particular stance one might take regarding this important intellectual project.  
 In what follows, I will try to review the general strategy of the book – which 
could be otherwise be mistaken for an “encyclopedic” exercise – focusing on three 
separate moments: (1) the role of psychology: the author’s decision to use the 
critique of psychology as the criteria of intelligibility of this historical reconstruction, 
(2) the underlying invariants: the constants which become legible when we take a 
look at the totality of these variable articulations between Freud and Marx (3) the new 
possibilities: some of the foreseeable consequences which such newly acquired 
indifferentiation might open up for those who are, nonetheless, not indifferent to the 
fate of Marxian and Freudian thinking.  
  
1. Psychology as a site 
 
In his introductory remarks, Pavón-Cuéllar points out that Marxism and 
Psychoanalysis distinguishes itself from the available bibliography for “its breadth” 
and for its “focus on the psychological elements” (2017: 3) of different Marxist 
orientations. What is left unclear, however, is why the choice to probe into “the 
psychological and anti-psychological ideas of Marxism” (ibid: 4) ended up allowing 
for such a vast study, at the same time “panoramic" in scope and succinct in style. As 
Louis Althusser reminds us, “one cannot see everything from everywhere” – it is only 
by adopting certain positions that one can render a totality legible – which begs, 
then, the question: how did this book manage to create such a concise, but broad 
panorama of the relations between Freud and Marx by adopting the standpoint of 
the critique of psychology? 
 An answer to this question might be sought in the particular definition of 
"psychology" taken up in this work. For Pavón-Cuéllar’s whole critical apparatus is 
built to preserve an essential ambivalence at the core of the concept of psychology, 
taken here to mean simultaneously the set of discourses about the interiority of the 
psyche and the practices which produce or conserve such an interiority. This 
position is particularly useful in that it clarifies the link between the internal 
consistency of the psyche as an object and the internal consistency of psychology as 
a theoretical discourse: if the psyche could not be taken as a self-standing object, 
then no discourse centered on the psyche would be possible – and inversely, the 
more the discourse of psychology seems consistent, the more it gives practical 
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support to the treatment of the psyche as an isolated or isolatable mental instance. 
By keeping this transitivity in view we widen the reach of our critical analysis, for it 
allows us to investigate, without shifting our position, four different ways one might 
keep a commitment to the psychic interior as an independent realm: (1) there are the 
psychological discourses that also admit the objectivity of internal psychology, (2) 
there are those theories which do not admit the given existence of a psychological 
interiority, but which “make up for it” with the consistency of their own psychological 
discourse, (3) there are those discourses which, albeit critical of psychology as a 
discipline, still suppose the existence of the interior as something to be “dissolved” 
through critique and therapy, (4) and there are those critical discourses which 
maintain that there is no self-standing autonomous psyche, but still suppose the self-
standing autonomy of the psychological discourse.  
 When our concept of psychology does not decide beforehand where one's 
commitment with the psychological interior will appear, it is able not only to 
recognize these ideological dependences within purportedly “progressive” 
psychologies but within even more radical critical positions which nonetheless 
remain overdetermined by the object of their critique. To construct a critique of 
psychology as a critique of the self-standing interior is, on the one hand, to admit as 
our object not a given discourse or entity, but rather a whole matrix of possible 
transformations, the field of all the possible positions where one might deposit one’s 
reliance on this ideological commitment. On the other hand, it also means that we 
must admit an incredible flexibility into our own critical discourse, training ourselves 
to navigate these different configurations within their own immanent terms in order 
to recognize where such commitment emerges. In this sense, rather than focusing 
on the individual moments of Cuellár’s investigation – his survey of uncountable 
authors and their particular projects – one should approach this as a continuous 
exercise, whose method grows in clarity as we accumulate its examples: not so 
much an encyclopedic effort as a propadeutic one. 
 We should note that Cuellar's decision to base the critique of psychology on 
the critique of interiority did not begin with Marxism and Psychoanalysis. His previous 
book, From the Conscious Interior to an Exterior Unconscious (Karnac, 2010), was 
already a solid effort of reconstructing the opposition between psychology and 
psychoanalysis in terms of two distinct topological structures. There, however, the 
conducting thread was a didactic reconstruction of the Lacanian perspective – that 
of the “exterior unconscious”. Which is not to say that Marxism was simply absent – 
quite on the contrary: one of the most remarkable features of the book was in fact the 
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courageous substitution of the already worn-out reliance on poetic equivocation as a 
means of transmission, so common amongst psychoanalysts, for a crystalline step-
by-step didactics which owes more to a Marxist commitment to universality than to 
any sort of “academicism”. Furthermore, Cuéllar’s choice of a case study – taken from 
an interview with a revolutionary militant - also signaled the author’s deep conviction 
that psychoanalysis is too important to be kept only within private (and public) 
clinical settings. 
 It is true that a survey of David Pavón-Cuéllar’s many works and articles - with 
a special mention to his still untranslated Elementos Políticos de Marxismo 
Lacaniano (Paradiso, 2014) - would dispel any surprise at finding both Marx and 
Freud joined together in this crusade against psychology. Since the publication of 
Marxisme Lacanien (Psychophores, 2009), Cuéllar has always positioned himself as 
a strong defender of the continuity between Freud and Marx – in opposition to those 
who believe that a political project should be derived straight from Freud or Lacan in 
order to substitute the Marxist one. Marxism and Psychoanalysis, however, takes this 
alliance a step further by reconstructing it from the ground up, through a concrete 
and localized theme. 
 This reconstruction is accomplished in the two inaugural chapters of the book. 
In the first chapter, “Marxian psychologies”, Pavón-Cuéllar goes through “the 
eighteen relatively independent Marxian psychologies” (11). The author's suspension 
of any commitment to demonstrate an internal unity between Marx’s different 
psychological ideas is crucial here. First of all, this attitude is prudent when one has 
already recognized that the interiority of the psyche can be sustained both in the 
guise the object of a theory as well as in the theory’s own internal coherence. But 
there are other merits to this approach: by simply organizing the consequences of 
Marx’s thinking for the ontology and epistemology of the psyche, Pavón-Cuéllar also 
localizes psychology as a region of effects within the Marxist horizon, rather than as 
an object which Marx constructed in order to criticize – like the value-form, for 
example - or as an ontological commitment which heuristically clarifies the true 
stakes of capitalist exploitation – like Marx’s early defense of the “generic being”. And, 
insofar as Marx’s theoretical framework is far from being a cohesive and systemic 
whole, even if the critique of psychology and of psychic interiority is already at work 
here, there is no synthetic standpoint binding these critical effects together. This is 
rather the task of the second chapter, which defends the continuity of the Marxian 
and Freudian doctrines: 
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we do not relate the two doctrines in their entirety, but only certain ideas 
relevant to discussions of psychology. Granting a certain priority to Marxian 
theory, we set out from its categories the eighteen approaches to 
psychology identified in the previous chapter, in order to discern how 
Freud may confirm, justify, explain, enrich, nuance, deepen, problematize 
or revitalize Marx’s contributions. We might say we are introducing Freud 
into a scene organized by Marx. (35) 
 
 What is essential here is that Freud is introduced as a thinker whose main 
challenge is not to propose a critique of psychological interiority – for this has already 
been recognized in Marx’s work - but rather to construct a theoretical and practical 
apparatus capable of developing these scattered critical effects into a coherent 
metapsychological framework. In other words, the underlying thesis of the second 
chapter, clearly defending the continuity between Marx and Freud, is that for Marx to 
further develop his own insights into the problem of the psyche he would have had 
to invent psychoanalysis – as a regional extension of an already existing theoretical 
“scene”. By mobilizing the eighteen "critical effects” listed in the previous chapter and 
retracing our steps, we arrive at the Freudian metapsychology, which introduces a 
depth of conceptual richness that was lacking in the purely Marxian psychologies as 
well as a new level of internal coherence between the eighteen formulations. 
 This last point – to which we will return later on – is, at first sight, the most 
paradoxical: if we began our review by suggesting that a radical critique of 
psychology must be wary of both the consistency of the psyche as an independent 
object and its consistency as an autonomous discourse, how could Freud provide us 
with a unified point of view for the Marxian the critique of psychology? This is where 
the clinical dimension comes in, as it conditions the internal coherence of the 
Freudian metapsychology not so much on what is theorized about the psychic 
apparatus, but on a practice which is itself dependent on exoteric and indeterminate 
factors. The psychoanalytic clinic allows for the continuity between the Marxian and 
Freudian theoretical frameworks, but it also introduces a certain unsurmountable 
fracture between the two, insofar as it is practically bound by scale and technical 
constraints. 
 We are now in condition to understand why it is that psychology functions as a 
special sort of site in Marxism and Psychoanalysis and why it is that, from this 
particular perspective, such a broad panorama could be constructed. A site – as the 
philosopher Alain Badiou suggests – is a place “at the edge of the void” of a given 
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situation: it is contained in the world, but what is contained in that site is not. Badiou 
gives us the example of the worker in factory: a worker is definitely a part of the world 
of labor, but what is contained in a worker – his singular life, his particular relation to 
his own concrete activity, etc – is not. A site is an unremarkable part of the world, if 
seen from the standpoint of an already established structure, but by probing into it 
we find the first traces of something new, something which does not belong to the 
architecture of the situation as a whole. The critique of psychology seems to function 
here precisely in this sense: on the one hand, it allows us to investigate the 
articulation between Marx and Freud through a particular and circumscribed theme, 
but, on the other, this theme already signals to an altogether different paradigm, as 
the critique of psychology is not merely a point in common between two 
heterogenous projects, but rather a point of passage from Marx to Freud. 
 This seems to be the underlying reason why so many different forms of 
articulation between Marxism and psychoanalysis could be counted together in 
Pavón-Cuéllar’s book: from the standpoint of the critique of psychology, which brings 
to the fore the continuity between these two fields, all attempts to relate Marx and 
Freud appear to equally fall short of asserting that Marxism and psychoanalysis are 
in fact in an absolute identity. To put it in more speculative terms: if we affirm that 
these two fields share the same being, then both the thesis that they are related and 
that they are not related are equally wrong – there is no relation because there are no 
discrete differences to relate.  
 
2. Underlying invariances 
 
In this review, I have tried to downplay the encyclopedic aspect of Marxism and 
Psychoanalysis, even though, in just under 200 pages, Pavón-Cuéllar references a 
vertiginous number of different thinkers and proposals of how to articulate Marx and 
Freud. This approach seems justified as the author recalls Marx in order to warn us 
that his method of investigation is "critique understood as a ‘weapon of war’ and not 
as a ‘surgeon's scalpel’, critique that seeks to ‘strike’ rather than to ‘clarify’, critique 
whose 'interest is not to refute, but to destroy’" (197). It is in view of this clear partisan 
positioning – which does not vacillate in stating that “psychology exists, is deplored, 
and must be confronted on the battlefield of critique” (ibid) – that we must consider 
the book less as an encyclopedia and more as a “weapon”. To assess the book as a 
dictionary or summarization would lead us to evaluate its merit on the basis of how 
well it represents the different trends and projects it condenses, but to assess it as a 
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weapon means to evaluate its capacity to strike a blow which affects its 
heterogeneous content as if hitting a homogenous block - it means to treat 
totalization as a form of critique. 
 I have argued above that Pavón-Cuéllar’s underlying thesis of an essential 
continuity between Marxism and psychoanalysis – present as nowhere else in the 
impasse of psychology – offers us a new perspective from which to analyze the 
different approximations between Marx and Freud throughout the 20th Century. In 
short, if we assume the hypothesis of an identity or at least a subsumption of 
psychoanalysis into Marxism, then the very formulation of the question of an 
articulation between the two, no matter how it is answered, already misses the point. 
Furthermore, this indifference, far from signaling one's disengagement with the 
matter at hand, allows us to treat this diverse history as a coherent historical 
sequence, and opens up the space for new developments. 
 Marxism and Psychoanalysis: In or Against Psychology? could in fact be 
divided into three parts: a first part composed of the first two chapters, in which the 
hypothesis of a continuity between Marx and Freud is established in view of the 
critique of psychology, then a second one, composed of chapters three to six, in 
which the author investigates the history of articulations between Marxism and 
psychoanalysis from the standpoint of this hypothesis, and finally a third section, 
comprised of chapters seven and eight, which explores the consequences and 
possibilities of this investigation. Let us then focus on the second part of the book, as 
it provides us with ample ground to justify the novelty of Pavón-Cuéllar’s approach. 
 In “From psychoanalysis to psychologization”, a first corollary of the book’s 
central hypothesis is explored, namely, that if the critique of psychology is essentially 
a Marxian endeavor, then the closer psychoanalysis is to Marxism, the less it is in 
danger of relapsing into psychologization of its own categories. As Pavón-Cuéllar 
states quite bluntly in the conclusion of this chapter “fortunately, there is still nothing 
like a Marxist ego psychology” (66) – and this is not by chance: as we have seen, the 
clinical grounds of psychoanalysis were a necessary condition for the expansion and 
systematization of the different critical perspectives on psychology inaugurated by 
Marx, but this necessary condition is always in danger of taking itself for a sufficient 
condition. This places psychoanalysis in a tense and inherently contradictory 
position: on the one hand, it is regionally constrained to the same space as 
psychology, but on the other, its critical heritage leads it to subvert and destroy 
psychology (59). This internal conflict leads to an oscillatory movement, well 
captured by the author in his survey: the closer psychoanalysis comes to Marx, as in 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 





the case of Jacques Lacan, who explicitly acknowledged the Marxian origin of 
several important ideas of psychoanalysis, the better equipped analysis is to sustain 
its subversive edge in face of psychology, while the more it tries to cut this 
connection in favor of conceptual autonomy, the more psychology returns with a 
vengeance (61), making psychoanalysis proportionally more reliant on objects and 
theoretical constructs which can guarantee its own “interiority". 
 In chapters four and five – “Psychology and its critique in Marxism” and 
“Marxist psychologies", – we look at the critique of psychology from the other side, 
that of Marxism. In chapter four, we explore a second corollary of our initial 
hypothesis: if there is a continuity between Marxian and Freudian perspectives, and 
psychoanalysis deepens and systematizes the critical position inaugurated by Marx, 
then Marxists are less in danger of revisionism the more they recognize, anticipate 
and respond to psychoanalysis. Pavón-Cuéllar’s detailed review of the psychological 
ideas of Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and others allows us to gauge the 
“discrepancies and coincidences” (91-92) between Marxism and psychoanalysis, but, 
above all, it also shines a light on a paradoxical status of what we have previously 
called the “region of effects” concerning the psychological in Marxian thinking. On 
the one hand, the more Marxists recognize that the reach of Marx’s ideas includes a 
treatment of the psyche, and therefore assume the task of considering the 
ontogenesis of the psyche and the question of psychic causality, the more they 
approach the psychoanalytic realm. On the other hand, this same movement also 
leads Marxists to substitute the opening towards psychoanalysis for other 
psychological theories, thereby compromising the power of Marx’s critique of 
psychology. This paradox is further examined in chapter five, which analyzes the 
work of Marxist psychologists. Here the contradiction between recognizing the 
effects of the Marxist critique of psychology and reifying this critique into a new 
consistent psychological theory is even more clearly felt. Working through the 
projects of Vigotsky, Rubinstein, Holzkamp, and many others, the author shows that 
the very attempt to produce a “marxist psychology” is problematic and requires, even 
in the best of cases, that some aspects of both Marxism and psychoanalysis be 
betrayed (111-112).  
 Chapter six, “Marxism, psychoanalysis and critique of psychology”, 
consolidates the reach of the initial insight of Marxism and Psychoanalysis by 
exploring a third corollary of its thesis: if there is a continuity between Marxian and 
Freudian ideas, then the critique of psychology in Marxism is best done by spousing 
a psychoanalytic position. Focusing mostly on different strands of Freudo-Marxism, 
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this chapter explores the work of thinkers who, aware of the limitations of 
psychology, sought psychoanalysis as a critical standpoint capable of surpassing the 
problematic nature of both Marxisms which do not engage with the critique of 
psychology and Marxist psychologies. However, as Pavón-Cuéllar shows us, this 
position, albeit recognizing and exploring the resonances between Marxism and 
psychoanalysis, ultimately encounter the structural limit of treating the relation of 
Marx and Freud as a relation. So, while, on the one hand, the contradiction of 
“marxist psychology” is overcome through the direct recourse to psychoanalysis, on 
the other, the “logical space” (148) produced by this articulation formally retains the 
distinction of two separate poles - Marx and Freud - which must be “bridged” in some 
way, a presupposition which, as the author shows, leads us, in some cases, to 
formulations which are neither Marxist nor Freudian, and which sacrifice both for the 
sake of establishing their connection, as in the case of Habermas or Honneth (141-
145). 
 Rather than signal a progression, the movement from chapter to chapter 
brings to evidence a certain displacement: chapter three mapped the tension 
between psychology and psychoanalysis, showing that without Marxism the latter 
tends to retract into the former; chapters four and five showed that Marxism on its 
own, however, is equally incapable of living up to its own critical insights: remaining 
at the analytic level of Marx himself, classical Marxists did not develop enough 
critical tools to avoid relapses into psychologism, but “diving" into psychology on 
their own did not lead to the overcoming of this impasse as well. Chapter six, finally, 
brings psychoanalysis and Marxism together, but we are still faced with the same 
tension, just in a new form: after haunting psychoanalysis and then Marxism, 
psychology returns here to haunt their very relation, to the point of compromising 
what it relates.  
 To turn a progression into a lateral displacement – this might be a possible 
definition of what it means to use totalization as a means of critique. But, more 
importantly, at this point we can already foresee the productive consequences of 
reviewing the history of articulations between Marx and Freud as a historical 
sequence bound together by an invariant trait. The fact that all these different 
attempts to relate Marx and Freud depart in one way or another from the faulty 
hypothesis that two separate fields are being brought together does not entail that 
we should dismiss any of them. Instead, this recognition allows us to reconstruct this 
rich and creative panorama as a common field of practical, institutional and 
conceptual experiments bound together by an implicit orientation towards the 
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critique of psychology. Going from Engels to Marcuse, from Vigotsky to Michael 
Schneider, Pávon-Cuéllar manages to truly patch up these conflicting conceptual 
fragments into a critical history which we can use - that is, he manages to history into 
a weapon. 
 
3. New possibilities 
 
Another, more synthetic way to approach the book’s conceptual strategy is to divide 
it in a first section concerning the continuity between Marxism and psychoanalysis, 
followed by a section analyzing the history of the relations between the two, leading 
up to two conclusive chapters dealing with their non-relation. While the first part is 
developed in close proximity to Marx and Freud themselves, the second one covers 
all possible forms of “Freudo-Marxisms” and “Marxo-Freudisms”, and concludes, no 
wonder, with a focus on the Frankfurt School. Finally, the third part, albeit equally 
heterogeneous as everything which preceded it, might nonetheless be historically 
located in relation to the "poststructuralist turn” and could perhaps be appropriately 
called a post-Althusserian or post-Lacanian sequence.  
 Indeed, most of the thinkers reviewed in this third and concluding section are 
associated with that singular moment in the history of Marxist and psychoanalytic 
thinking which was the political and intellectual environment in post-war France. Due 
to well-known reasons, a common tendency emerged in political and 
psychoanalytical domains at the time, opening both fields to the theoretical problem 
of a rigorous return to the fundamental insights of Marx and Freud and to the 
practical challenge of thinking emancipation from the standpoint of the colonies, 
thereby detaching each praxis from their culturally-specific variables. With this, a 
major shift in the very structure of the project of articulating Marx and Freud became 
possible: rather than looking for a communion of objects, suddenly it was suddenly 
possible to theoretically affirm that they were in fact identically placed.  
 Louis Althusser, for example, defended (at least for some time) the absolute 
separation of both theoretical projects while maintaining that they share the same 
“method”. For him, both Marxism and psychoanalysis are “conflicting sciences” 
which, albeit dealing with entirely different theoretical objects – political economy 
and the unconscious, respectively – share problems of the same form due to the fact 
that both fields are part of their object of critique: Marxist organizations and theories 
are susceptible to ideology critique just as psychoanalysts are susceptible to their 
own unconscious. Jacques Lacan in a certain sense consolidated the movement 
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initiated by Althusser: Marxism and psychoanalysis are linked insofar as both Marx 
and Freud recognized the structural paradoxes at the heart of representational logic - 
leading to the theory of surplus-value and the theory of the drives, respectively - but 
not only do they not share any similar objects, they also do not share a common 
method. For Lacan, an essential dissymmetry would separate Marxian and Freudian 
practices, given that the revolutionary perspective of Marxism would still cling to an 
overcoming of social discontent while psychoanalysis would fully recognize the 
structural import of these paradoxes hindering human satisfaction. The identity at the 
heart of Marx and Freud would thus emerge as an unsurpassable 
incommensurability - a “non-relation”, to use the Lacanian parlance.  
 Thus, the third section of Pavón-Cuéllar’s book - comprised of the last two 
chapters, “Towards a critical metapsychology” and “Critique as praxis” - is marked by 
the challenge of thinking beyond the relation of Marx and Freud - and therefore 
“beyond psychology” (150) - which, as I have suggested, also means to think after 
Althusser and Lacan. 
 Chapter seven reviews some of the most important projects which sought to 
answer in one way or another, to the challenges raised by this new paradigm, both 
by further developing the theoretical insights of Althusser and Lacan as well as by 
transposing this challenge to new social conditions outside of Europe. In a certain 
sense, we have crossed a threshold which brings us to the “edge of the void” of 
psychology: we are no longer analyzing the displacements of psychology from the 
standpoint of our underlying continuity between Marxism and psychoanalysis, but 
directly investigating what this continuity could entail. A “critical metapsychology” is 
precisely what emerges from this underside: once the psychological interior is 
purged from Marxism, psychoanalysis and from their relation, we must concede that 
“there is only one exteriority without a psychological interiority substantially different 
from the exteriority” (152). Marxism and psychoanalysis are finally tied together by 
their recourse to the same radical “exteriority”, initially introduced by Althusser as the 
methodological orientation that is grounded on its exteriority to itself and by Lacan as 
the ontological orientation by that which concretely insists as exterior in any 
interiority. The projects of Laclau, Badiou, Zizek, Braunstein, Rozitcher and many 
others, analyzed in this chapter, all appear as different attempts to critically mobilize 
this impossible topology while remaining aware of the dangers of transforming it into 
the “interior” of a new project – only a metapsychological standpoint can therefore 
affirm that what ties Marxism and psychoanalysis together is their shared structural 
blind spot. 
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 The last chapter, finally takes us from this fringe position to a whole new vista 
of what is possible today: from the intrusive character of the “real" to the extrusive 
force of tactical and strategic action (175). “Praxis”, defined as an immanent tarrying 
with this exteriority, enters the picture as a new site from which the continuity 
between Marxism and psychoanalysis can be evaluated, experimented and 
discovered. At this point it one of those self-evident facts which hides in plain sight 
suddenly becomes clear: all three sequences which Pavón-Cuéllar tracks in Marxism 
and psychoanalysis are primarily concerned with grounding the transitivity, relation 
or negative community of Marx and Freud at the theoretical level - even if with some 
important exceptions along the way. The idea that one can only affirm and defend 
this continuity through a practical engagement - that is, at the very place where 
knowledge, critical or otherwise, falters – becomes discernible only against the 
already saturated history of the critique of psychology in Marxism and 
psychoanalysis. All different sorts of struggles – communist strategy, populist and 
feminist movements, as well as institutional projects and emancipatory forces – are 
read here from the standpoint of their practical contribution to the “destruction of 
psychology” (195): not only as a theoretical discipline, but also as a pathological and 
ideological discipline of the psychic interior: 
 
Surmounting psychology - as we explained earlier - requires going beyond 
theory. The criticized psychology must be overcome in practice: 
challenging all psychological rationality in a taking of power like that of 
Iglesias and Errejón, recovering the feminist space usurped by psychology 
as in Firestone, refuting the dependency complex through struggles for 
independence as in Fanon, resolving the interior psychopathological 
problem in the institutional exterior as in Tosquelles, and undermining the 
classist conditioning of psychological dualism and de-psychologizing 
psychoanalysis as in Politizer. It should be stressed that political practices 
do not apply the theoretical critique of psychology, but rather continue it, 
deepen it, demonstrate its truth, and resolve some of the problems that it 
confronts. (194) 
 
Concrete militant politics is the continuation of the theoretical critique of psychology 
because at its origin psychoanalysis was always a continuation of Marxian thinking.  
